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Abstract
Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem.
One possible explanation is that board of directors, especially compensation
committees, intervene to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. In this study, we
examine whether the characteristics of board of directors and compensation
committee affect their effectiveness in mitigating the CEO horizon problem.
We find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when
CEOs have more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms
with large board of directors and compensation committee are less likely to
manage accruals.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
CEOs face horizon problem. That is, CEOs with
earnings-based compensation may focus on boosting
firms' short-term performance at the expense of share-
holders' long-term interests. Extant research has found
inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem.
One possible explanation for the mixed findings is that
compensation committees design CEO compensation in
such way that discourages retiring CEOs from opportu-
nistic earnings management (Cheng, 2004) and R&D
reduction (Huson, Tian, Wiedman, & Wier, 2012). Board
of directors (hence the board), especially the compensation
committee, is responsible to adjust CEO compensation
package to alleviate this agency problem with myopic
horizon. However, not all directors are equally effective.
This study examines whether certain characteristics of the
board and compensation committee can affect the ability
to mitigate CEO horizon problem.
To effectively mitigate CEO horizon problem, the
board and the compensation committee need to act inde-
pendently and to align the interests of CEOs with those of
shareholders. The board and the compensation committee
should be aware of CEOs' horizon problem and adjust
their compensation packages accordingly.
Using a sample of 13,606 firm-year observations for
S&P 1500 firms from 1998 to 2011, we find that both
CEO power and director tenure increase the likelihood
of R&D curtailment when CEOs approach retirement.
We also find that the size of the board and the compen-
sation committee decreases the likelihood of accruals
management when companies face a CEO horizon
problem.
This study contributes to the literature twofold. First, we
provide further empirical evidence to echo the debate over
CEO horizon problem. Previous studies (Cazier, 2011;
Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Gibbons & Murphy, 1992;
Kalyta, 2009; Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993)
provide mixed evidence of the horizon problem because
they do not consider the role of board and more specifically
the role of the compensation committee in determining
CEO compensation package. Moreover, the study adds to
the literature on corporate governance, revealing that board
of director and compensation committees characteristics
affect the effectiveness of mitigating an organization's CEO
horizon problem.
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents a literature review; Section 3 discusses
the hypothesis development; Models are discussed in
Section 4; Data and sample is presented in Section 5;
Section 6 reports the study's empirical results; and the
final section concludes the article.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
A manager's tenure is much shorter than a firm's
lifespan. Managers' with shorter horizons can be myopic.
They tend to focus on increasing the firm's short-term
earnings. This horizon problem is more severe as man-
agers approach retirement because they have weaker
career concerns (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992).
Consistent with CEO horizon problem, Dechow and
Sloan (1991) find empirical evidence that R&D expendi-
ture reduces prior to CEO departures. However, Murphy
and Zimmerman (1993) suggest that the reductions in
R&D expenditures preceding CEO departures are driven
by poor firm performance rather than horizon problems.
Several studies find no evidence that R&D spending is
related to CEO horizon problem. Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1992) find that firms spend most on R&D and adver-
tising in the CEO's last year prior to retirement. Butler
and Newman (1989) fail to find evidence of R&D expen-
diture reductions in the sample of firms with CEOs in
their final year before departures compared with a mat-
ched sample of firms. Cazier (2011) concludes that CEOs
do not cut R&D spending in their final years prior to
retirement.
Kalyta (2009) argue that CEOs may use discretionary
accruals to increase contemporaneous earnings, which
supports CEO horizon problem. Kalyta (2009) finds evi-
dence of income-increasing accruals management in the
years prior to CEO retirement when the CEO's Supple-
mental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) is contingent
on firm performance. However, several studies find
inconsistent evidence with outgoing CEOs who boost
earnings by involving income-increasing accruals man-
agement. Pourciau (1993) focused on the nonroutine
CEO turnovers and found income-decreasing accruals
and write-offs before the nonroutine CEO turnovers.
Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) find a significant nega-
tive association between accruals and the CEO transition.
Using a sample of Australian firms, Wells (2002) finds no
evidence of income-increasing accruals management
prior to CEO turnover, despite whether the turnovers are
routine or nonroutine.
Compensation committee, as a subcommittee of the
board responsible for overseeing the executive compensa-
tion packages, can foresee and mitigate CEO horizon
problem (Cheng, 2004; Huson et al., 2012). Cheng (2004)
finds that the association between changes in R&D
spending and changes in the value of CEO annual option
grants is significantly positive when the CEO approaches
retirement but is insignificant when there is no horizon
or myopia problem. Cheng's (2004) findings indicate that
compensation committee may have mitigated opportu-
nistic R&D reduction by rewarding (penalizing) CEOs for
increasing (reducing) R&D expenditures when CEOs face
horizon and myopia problem. Huson et al. (2012) find
that compensation committees are able to place a lower
relative weight on the positive change in discretionary
accruals compared with other components of earnings
when setting CEO cash pay during the years before CEO
voluntary turnovers.
The monitoring effectiveness of compensation com-
mittees is determined by the committee's characteristics
(e.g., Bebchuk, Grinstein, & Peyer, 2010; Collins, Gong, &
Li, 2009; Laksmana, 2008; Nelson, Gallery, &
Percy, 2010; Sun & Cahan, 2009; Sun & Cahan, 2012;
Sun, Cahan, & Emanuel, 2009). Sun and Cahan (2012)
argue that six compensation committee characteristics
affect compensation committee quality. Two other stud-
ies (Sun et al., 2009; Sun & Cahan, 2009) use the same
measure of compensation committee quality to examine
whether the compensation committee quality affects the
pay-for-performance. Bebchuk et al. (2010) document
that a compensation committee consists of independent
directors and at least one blockholder who is less likely
to grant CEO options opportunistically at the lowest price
of the month. Similarly, Collins et al. (2009) document a
negative association between the likelihood of backdating
CEO stock option grants and having an outsider who
owns at least 5 % of outstanding shares on the compensa-
tion committee. Several studies also claim that compen-
sation committee characteristics are associated with
disclosure transparency of executive compensation
(Laksmana, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010).
Prior event studies suggest that stock market reacts to
directors' characteristics and CEO horizon problem
(Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004; Kalyta, 2009;
Weisbach, 1988). Weisbach (1988) finds that CEO turn-
overs are preceded by negative stock returns for firms
with boards of directors dominated by outsiders, but not
for firms with insider-dominated boards, indicating inde-
pendent directors are more able to replace CEOs with
poor performance. Moreover, by studying the stock prices
around the turnover announcements, Weisbach (1988)
finds that stock market reacts positively to the announce-
ment of turnovers if the turnovers are preceded by poor
performance and the board is outsider-dominated. Con-
sistent withWeisbach's (1988) findings, Huson et al. (2004)
study 1,344 CEO turnovers between 1971 and 1994 and
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documents positive abnormal stock returns around turn-
over announcements. However, unlike forced CEO turn-
overs (i.e., fired, policy disagreement, death and illness,
merger, etc.), retirements can be predicted and may not
lead to abnormal stock returns. Kalyta (2009) finds no
evidence of abnormal stock returns around CEO retire-
ments, but observes negative abnormal returns around
CEO retirements when the CEOs have performance-
contingent pensions. Kalyta's (2009) study suggests that
investors perceive CEO horizon problem as bad news.
3 | HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 | CEO power
CEOs who are also chairmen of the board can exert more
influence over the decision-making process (Adams,
Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005). Jensen (1993) advocates the
separation of the CEO and chairman position, arguing
that chairmen are responsible for overseeing CEOs, but if
CEOs also hold the position of chairmen, they may act in
their own interests when they perform critical functions
such as evaluating and compensating themselves.
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) find that firms sub-
ject to enforcement actions by the SEC for earnings man-
agement are more likely to have CEOs who also serve as
chairmen of the board.
Director monitoring is a critical mechanism to allevi-
ate agency costs; however, the effectiveness of the moni-
toring is reduced if the chairman of the board is assumed
by the CEO, or if most of the directors on the board are
co-opted by the incumbent CEO. Hence, we predict:
H1 CEO horizon problem is positively associated with
CEO power.
3.2 | Director independence
It has been widely documented that a board with more
independent directors help monitor managers more effec-
tively. Weisbach (1988) shows that boards dominated by
outside directors are more likely to remove CEOs when
the companies suffer from poor performance. A number
of studies show that board independence improves the
quality of the financial reporting process. Dechow
et al. (1996) find that board independence is inversely
associated with the likelihood of being charged by SEC
for earnings manipulations. Similarly, Beasley (1996)
finds that board independence negatively associates with
financial statement fraud. Uzun, Szewczyk, and
Varma (2004) compare the governance in firms that have
committed fraud and those that have not. They note that
the percentage of independent directors is higher in firms
that have not engaged in fraud than the firms that have.
Klein (2002a) documents a negative association between
board independence and abnormal accruals. Board inde-
pendence also improves firm disclosures (Ajinkya,
Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005).
Finally, Byard, Li, and Weintrop (2006) show that the
quality of analysts' earnings forecast an increase if the
board is more independent.
If independent directors are more aligned with share-
holder benefits, we expect that board and compensation
committee independence reduce CEO pay and the CEO
horizon problem. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H2 CEO horizon problem is negatively associated with
board and compensation committee independence.
3.3 | Board and compensation
committee size
A number of scholars have expressed their concern about
large board sizes (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992;
Yermack, 1996). For example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
suggest that board sizes should not be larger than
10 members, since it is difficult for every director to
express his or her opinion freely in the limited time when
they meet. Moreover, they point out that it is hard for a
large board to become a cohesive body due to poor com-
munication and lack of a common purpose. Jensen (1993)
argues that boards that consist of more than seven
or eight members are more subjective to CEO control.
Those two studies are consistent with organizational
behavior research studies, such as Steiner (1972) and
Hackman (1990), which argue that as work groups
become larger, productivity decreases. Yermack (1996)
provides empirical evidence that board size negatively
associates with a firm's value. He also shows that firms
with large boards are less likely to have favorable profit-
ability and operating efficiency financial ratios, to provide
CEO compensation sensitive to firm performance, and to
remove CEOs.
In contrast, larger boards have a wider knowledge
base and it is easier for larger boards to distribute the
workload. For example, Klein (2002b) and Anderson,
Mansi, and Reeb (2004) suggest that large boards are
more effective in monitoring the financial accounting
process. Klein (2002b) suggests that as a board size
increases, the board is more likely to assign an indepen-
dent audit committee. Consistent with her prediction,
she finds that as a board size increases, an audit commit-
tee's independence increases. Anderson et al. (2004) find
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that larger boards are associated with lower cost of debt,
while Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that larger
boards are more likely to update management earnings
forecasts. Laksmana (2008) finds that board size increases
the executive compensation disclosure transparency.
Whether a firm can benefit from a large board of
directors may depend on the complexity of the firm
(Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). Coles et al. (2008) argue
that complex firms, those high in industry diversification,
size, and leverage, require more advising from their
board of directors, and as a result can benefit from a large
board. They find that for simple firms, firm value
decreases as board size increases; however, for complex
firms, firm value increases as board size increases. Draw-
ing from the findings of previous studies, we predict that
the size of the board and compensation committee affects
CEO compensation and CEO horizon problem. Neverthe-
less, We make no prediction about the sign. We hypothe-
size that:
H3 CEO horizon problem is associated with board and
compensation committee size.
3.4 | Busy directors
The number of directorship may be a sign of director rep-
utation, since an external labor market disciplines direc-
tors by rewarding or reducing directorships based on
their performance (Gilson, 1990; Kaplan &
Reishus, 1990). Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find that
CEOs of firms that reduce dividends are less likely to sit
on other boards. Gilson (1990) finds that the number of
directorships reduces after directors resign from finan-
cially distressed firms. Consistently, Ferris, Jagannathan,
and Pritchard (2003) find that previous firm performance
has a positive effect on directors' ability to attract direc-
torships. Two studies examine the association between
the likelihood of being a target of takeover and number
of directorships (Shivdasani, 1993) and future director-
ships (Harford, 2003). Shivdasani (1993) documents
that firms with outside directors holding fewer additional
directorships are more likely to be a target of hostile take-
over attempts. Harford (2003) documents that directors
of a takeover or merger target lose future directorships.
Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence that busy directors
are less effective monitors. They find no evidence that
number of directorships per director or number of direc-
torships held by outside directors relate to firm value or
the likelihood of securities fraud litigation. Moreover,
they find positive and significant market reaction to the
appointment announcement of a new director who holds
multiple directorships, suggesting shareholders value
directors' reputation. They also find that directors holding
multiple directorships sit on more committees and attend
more committee meetings, which contrast the idea that
directors holding multiple directorships are overcom-
mitted and shirk their responsibilities.
However, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) are concerned
that directors are busy with more than one boards, and
cannot emphasize one particular board. Beasley (1996)
documents a positive relationship between number of
additional directorships held by outside directors and the
likelihood of financial statement fraud. Fich and
Shivdasani (2006) define busy directors as those who hold
three or more directorships. They show that firms with
boards dominated by outside busy directors have lower
market-to-book ratios, lower operating performance, and
are less likely to remove CEOs for poor performance.
They also find positive abnormal returns after busy out-
side directors announce their departure. Furthermore,
they find negative abnormal returns when a director
becomes a busy director as a result of obtaining one addi-
tional directorship, and even more negative when the
board becomes dominated by busy directors. Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) measure busy directors
as those who serve on three or more corporate boards.
They argue that by focusing on directors who hold more
than two other directorships rather than on those with
average directorships, they can capture the degree of a
director's over-commitment. They find that as the per-
centage of busy outside directors increases, CEO compen-
sation increases. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find
that if CEOs can exert more influence on the appoint-
ment of new directors positively, the appointee is more
likely to be a busy director and hold more board seats,
which indicates that CEOs prefer less effective monitors.
If busy directors cannot devote adequate time and atten-
tion to one particular board, the percentage of busy direc-
tors on the board or compensation committee may
increase CEO compensation and face the CEO horizon
problem. Therefore, we predict:
H4 The CEO horizon problem is positively associated with
the percentage of busy directors sitting on the board
and compensation committee.
3.5 | Director tenure
As director tenure increases, directors gain more experi-
ence. More experienced directors can provide higher
quality governance. For example, Buchanan (1974) shows
that managers' years of organizational service can
enhance their commitment to exert high levels of effort
to achieve the goal of the firm. Beasley (1996) finds that
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as outside director tenure increases, the likelihood of
financial statement fraud decreases.
However, Katz (1982) finds that long tenure can be
detrimental to the communication within and outside of
organizations, due to the increasing stability in member-
ship. Vafeas (2003) argues that directors with long tenure
are more likely to be friendly to managers. He finds that
senior directors who have held their board seats for
20 years or more on the compensation committee pay
CEOs more generously, which supports the theory that
long tenure compromises director monitoring efforts. The
National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) advo-
cates a limit of 10–15 years of board service so that new
directors can bring new ideas and the board can better
accommodate to the changing business conditions. If
directors are more likely to be entrenched if they hold
their directorships for a long time, we expect that the
average tenure of directors on the board or the compen-
sation committee increases CEO compensation and the
CEO horizon problem. We hypothesize that:
H5 CEO horizon problem is positively associated with the
tenure of directors on boards of directors and com-
pensation committees.
3.6 | Director ownership
Directors who have high equity ownership have more incen-
tives to monitor CEOs (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999).
Among others, Shivdasani (1993), Vafeas (2003),
Klein (2002a), and Beasley (1996) provide evidence that
directors with high ownership are aligned with shareholders.
Shivdasani (1993) documents a negative association between
equity ownership by outside directors and the possibility
of firms being a target of hostile takeover attempts.
Vafeas (2003) shows that director ownership is rather low,
even for senior directors whose tenure is longer than
20 years. He finds a negative relationship between director
ownership and total CEO pay. Klein (2002a) documents an
inverse association between the presence of an outside blo-
ckholder on an audit committee and abnormal accruals,
indicating that director ownership affects the monitoring
over financial reporting quality. Beasley (1996) finds that
firms which commit fraud have higher directors' sharehold-
ing than firms which do not commit fraud. Rosenstein and
Wyatt (1997) examine the stock market reaction to
announcement of new inside directors and find that share-
holders value expertise of inside directors when they own
more than 5% of the firm's shares However, Core et al. (1999)
find no empirical evidence that CEO compensation is associ-
atedwith director ownership. If director ownership enhances
the alignment the interest of directors and shareholders, we
expect that as director ownership increases, CEO compensa-
tion and CEO horizon problem decreases, holding all else
constant. Hence, we predict.
H6 The CEO horizon problem is negatively associated
with the average tenure of directors on boards of
directors and compensation committees.
4 | MODELS
We follow the model of Cazier (2011) to test whether the
board's characteristics affect CEO tendency in cutting
R&D expenditure in their final years prior to retirement
as follows:










+ β14TOBINS_Q+ β15LAG_RET+ β16FCF
+ β17ROA+ β18SIZE+ β19FIRM_AGE
+ β20EQUITY_INCENTIVES
+ β21INDUSTRY_RD+YEAR+ ε
where RD is the R&D expenditure scaled by total assets,
HORIZON is an indicator variable that equals to one if the
CEO is in the final 2 years before retirement, and zero other-
wise. We also follow Cazier (2011) to control for other vari-
ables that may affect R&D expenditures and relate to the
CEO horizon problem and compensation committee co-
option.TOBINS_Q is calculated as themarket value of equity
plus the book value of debt, scaled by total assets. LAG_RET
is the firm's stock return from the previous year. FCF is the
operating cash flows plus R&D expenseminus capital expen-
ditures, scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before
R&D expense scaled by assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm
of total assets at the beginning of fiscal year t. FIRM_AGE is
the number of years between year t and the first year the
company was listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES
is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock
price, as measured in Core and Guay's study (Core &
Guay, 2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expendi-
ture of other firms in the same two-digit SIC industry.
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We predict the coefficient on TOBINS_Q and
LAG_RET to be positive, since firms with more growth
opportunities may invest more in R&D. Consistent with
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), we predict that R&D
expenditures positively associate with internal finance,
which is measured by the firm's free cash flow (FCF). we
predict that R&D expenditures negatively relate to
accounting flexibility, as measured by ROA, since Wang
and D'Souza (2006) suggest that when accounting flexi-
bility is low, managers are more likely to engage in real
earnings management. We expect that R&D spending
varies with firm size. Cohen and Klepper (1996) suggest
that it is advantageous for larger firms to invest in R&D
since they can apply R&D results to greater output and
therefore reduce the average cost of R&D. Based on the
findings of Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004), we predict
that firm age (FIRM_AGE) negatively associates with
R&D expenditures, since older firms are less likely to
introduce innovations. CEOs with more equity holdings
are likely to have a long-term relationship with their
EXHIBIT 1 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the R&D test
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable n Mean SD Lower quartile Median Upper quartile
RD 5,599 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.07
HORIZON 5,599 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOBINS_Q 5,599 2.07 1.13 1.32 1.72 2.46
LAG_RET 5,599 0.10 0.45 −0.21 0.05 0.31
FCF 5,599 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.17
ROA 5,599 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.19
SIZE 5,599 7.29 1.43 6.22 7.12 8.23
FIRM_AGE 5,599 26.15 16.64 12.00 20.00 41.00
EQUITY_INCENTIVES 5,599 629.56 1,288.63 88.13 227.47 605.18
INDUSTRY_RD 5,599 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.12 0.20
Panel B: Pearson correlations
RD TOBINS_Q LAG_RET FCF ROA SIZE FIRM_AGE EQUITY_INCENTIVES
TOBINS_Q .26
LAG_RET .00 .12
FCF −.43 .17 .03
ROA .33 .58 .17 .25
SIZE −.19 −.08 −.05 .16 −.07
FIRM_AGE −.19 −.15 −.05 .03 −.07 .51
EQUITY_INCENTIVES .02 .35 .04 .12 .14 .22 −.05
INDUSTRY_RD .31 .09 .02 −.09 .15 .01 .08 −.03
Note: Panel A reports the descriptive statistics. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one
if CEOs are in each of the final 2 years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity
plus the book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm's stock return from previous year. FCF is the operating cash
flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of years between the current
year and the first year the company listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC
industry.
Panel B reports the Pearson correlations. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity
plus the book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm's stock return from previous year. FCF is the operating cash
flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled by assets.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the number of years between the current
year and the first year the company listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in
stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002). INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC
industry. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than .05 are in boldface.
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firms and are willing to spend in R&D to improve future
earnings, although R&D expenditures reduce current
earnings (Barker III & Mueller, 2002). Therefore, we
predict the coefficient on EQUITY_INCENTIVES to be
positive. Consistent with prior studies (Cheng, 2004;
Dechow & Sloan, 1991), we also control for the indus-
try average R&D expenditures. We exclude each firm-
year from the calculation of the industry average R&D
to prevent a mechanical relation between RD and
INDUSTRY_RD.
To examine whether the board's characteristics are
associated with accruals management in CEOs' final
years before retirement, we run the following model
cross-sectionally:
















where DA is the discretionary accruals. Our control vari-
ables are similar to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).
We control for CEO equity incentive, as CEOs have more
incentives to manage earnings when their wealth is more
sensitive to the firms' share price (Bergstresser &
Philippon, 2006). We also follow Core and Guay (2002)
to measure equity incentives; EQUITY_INCENTIVES is
the dollar change in a CEO's wealth following a 1%
change in stock price, then normalized by the sum of
the dollar change, salary, and bonus. SIZE is the natu-
ral logarithm of total assets at the beginning of fiscal
year t. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of
cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over
the current and previous 4 years. STD_REV is the stan-
dard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the
current and previous 4 years. STD_SALESGROWTH is
the standard deviation of sales growth over the current
and previous 4 years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm
has been listed on Compustat for more than 20 years,
and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities
deflated by total assets. MARKETTOBOOK represents
deciles of market value of assets divided by the book
value of assets ranked within each year. G_INDEX rep-
resents the governance indicator variables described in
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). G1 is a dummy
variable equal to one if the G-score is less than or equal
to 6, and zero otherwise. G2 is a dummy variable equal
to one if the G-score is between 7 (inclusive) and
9 (inclusive), and zero otherwise. G3 is a dummy vari-
able equal to one if the G-score is between 10 (inclu-
sive) and 12 (inclusive), and zero otherwise. G4 is a
dummy variable equal to one if the G-score is greater
than or equal to 13, and zero otherwise. EXCHANGE is
an indicator for the stock exchange where the company
is traded. INDUSTRY is the Fama and French (1997)
industry classification indicator. YEAR represents year
indicators.
We expect firm size (SIZE) to negatively associate
with discretionary accruals, since larger firms are
under more scrutiny by analysts and the press
(Duellman, Ahmed, & Abdel-Meguid, 2013). we expect
that discretionary accruals vary with firm age
(OLDFIRM), the standard deviation of cash flows from
operations (STD_CASHFLOW), the standard deviation
of revenues (STD_REV), the standard deviation of sales
growth (STD_SALESGROWTH), and governance
(G_INDEX), consistent with prior literature (Duellman
et al., 2013; Jiang, Petroni, & Wang, 2010).
5 | DATA AND SAMPLE
SELECTION
We collect director data from RiskMetrics for the
period from 1998 to 2011. RiskMetrics provides direc-
tor information, including committee membership,
shareholding, age, independence, additional director-
ships, and tenure, as well as the year directorship
starts for directors in S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P
SmallCap firms. We lose 2,445 firm-year observations
as they lack CEO compensation data from Execucomp.
We further lose 479 firm-year observations which miss
the date when the CEO was hired. We exclude 2,788
financial institutions (SIC codes 6,000–6,999). We also
exclude 595 observations that have missing Compustat
inputs to calculate sales, return, and ROA, and
352 observations lacking number of shares held by
the CEO. Finally, we trim the top and bottom 1 % of
all continuous variables to mitigate the effect of
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outliers. Our final sample consists of 13,606 firm-year
observations.
6 | RESULTS
Exhibit Panel A displays the descriptive statistics for the
variables used in R&D test. Pearson correlations are
reported in Exhibit Panel B.
Exhibit shows the Pearson correlations between the
variables in this study to capture board and compensa-
tion committee characteristics. CC_COOPTION is
the proportion of directors who are appointed after the
CEO assumes office on the compensation committee.
B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are
appointed after the CEO assumes office on the board of
directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to
one if the majority of compensation committee directors
are co-opted by the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise.
COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to one if the
majority of directors on a board are co-opted by the
incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise. CEO_CHAIR is an
indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is the chair-
man of the board, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPEN-
DENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board.
CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on a
compensation committee. IND_NORM is an indicator
variable equal to one if the firm has a nominating
EXHIBIT 2 Pearson correlations between the board and compensation committee characteristics variables




4.CC_COOPTION −.03 .02 .91
5.B_LONGSERV −.03 .00 .00 .01
6.CC_LONGSERV −.02 −.01 −.03 −.06 .69
7.B_SIZE .01 .00 .02 .01 −.00 .00
8.CC_SIZE .03 .00 .02 .02 .00 −.00 .99
9.B_OWNERSHIP −.24 −.14 .04 .05 .01 .01 −.01 −.02
10.CC_OWNERSHIP −.13 −.21 −.00 −.02 .01 .02 −.01 .00 .66
11.B_BUSY .12 .02 −.09 −.09 −.02 −.01 .02 .02 −.05 −.02
12.CC_BUSY .07 .03 −.07 −.07 −.02 −.00 .02 .02 −.03 −.03 .79
13.CEO_CHAIR .01 −.03 .19 .17 −.02 −.02 .05 .03 .01 −.02 .10 .08
14.IND_NORM .51 .42 −.01 .00 −.02 −.02 −.01 −.01 −.14 −.10 .01 −.00 −.04
15.COOPTED_CC −.02 .02 .80 .90 .01 −.05 .01 .01 .04 −.02 −.08 −.06 .15 −.00
16.COOPTED_B −.01 −.01 .87 .81 .00 −.03 .01 .01 .03 −.01 −.07 −.06 .18 −.02 .77
Note: This exhibit displays the Pearson correlations between the board and compensation committee characteristics variables. Correlations
significant at the 5% level or less appear in bold. CC_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes
office on the compensation committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the
board of directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are appointed
after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to one if the majority of directors
on the board are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. CEO_CHAIR is an indicator variable equal to one
if CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the board of
directors. CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the compensation committee. IND_NORM is an indicator variable equal
to one if the firm has a nominating committee that consists of only outside directors. CC_SIZE is the number of directors on the
compensation committee. B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board of directors. B_BUSY is the proportion of board directors who sit
on more than three other boards of public companies. CC_BUSY is the proportion of compensation committee directors who sit on more
than three other boards of public companies. B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of directors on the board. CC_LONGSERV is the average
tenure of directors on the compensation committee. CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on the compensation committee
divided by total outstanding shares. B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by directors on the board divided by total outstanding shares.
B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board.
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committee that consists of only outside directors.
CC_SIZE is the number of directors on a compensation
committee. B_SIZE is the number of directors on the
board. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that since the
number of directorships held by directors disperses
widely, the average number of directorships is a noisy
measure to identify busy directors. Therefore, we define
busy directors as those who hold more than three addi-
tional directorships. B_BUSY is the proportion of board
directors who sit on more than three other boards of pub-
lic companies. CC_BUSY is the proportion of compensa-
tion committee directors who sit on more than three
other boards of public companies. B_LONGSERV is the
average tenure of directors on a board. CC_LONGSERV
is the average tenure of directors on a compensation
committee. CC_OWNERSHIP is the total shares held by
directors on a compensation committee divided by total
outstanding shares. B_OWNERSHIP is the total shares
held by directors on a board divided by total outstanding
shares. B_SIZE is the number of directors on board.
Most of those variables are correlated. Therefore,
we use a principal component analysis to transform
board and compensation committee characteristic vari-
ables into a set of common factors. Consistent with
Laksmana (2008), we retain all factors with an eigen-
value greater than one. We use an oblique rotation
since oblique rotation often produces more useful pat-
terns than do orthogonal rotations. Six factors with an
eigenvalue greater than one are retained and those six
factors can explain 79.78% of the variation.
Exhibit presents the factors identified in a principal
components analysis. CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION,
COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have
high loadings on the first factor that is indicated as
CEO_POWER. B_INDEPENDENCE, CC_INDEPENDENCE
and IND_NORM load highly on the second factor INDE-
PENDENCE. Two variables, CC_SIZE and B_SIZE, have
high loadings on the third factor DIR_SIZE. B_BUSY
and CC_BUSY have high loadings on the fourth factor,
BUSY_DIR. Two variables measuring director tenure,
B_LONGSERV and CC_LONGSERV, load highly on the
fifth factor, DIR_TENURE. CC_OWNERSHIP and
B_OWERSHIP have high loadings on the sixth factor,
DIR_OWNERSHIP.
The multivariate analysis of the effect of board and
compensation committee factors on the association
between R&D spending and CEO horizon problem is
presented in Exhibit . The coefficient on the interac-
tion term HORIZON × CEO_POWER is negative and
significant (coefficient = −0.003, p = .03), suggesting
that as CEO power increases, CEOs are more likely
to reduce R&D expenditures when they approach














2 INDEPENDENCE B_INDEPENDENCE 0.848
CC_INDEPENDENCE 0.794
IND_NORM 0.793
3 DIR_SIZE CC_SIZE 0.996
B_SIZE 0.996
4 BUSY_DIR B_BUSY 0.936
CC_BUSY 0.93
5 DIR_TENURE B_LONGSERV 0.919
CC_LONGSERV 0.918
6 DIR_OWNERSHIP CC_OWNERSHIP 0.909
B_OWNERSHIP 0.896
Note: This exhibit presents the six factors identified in principal
components analysis. CC_COOPTION is the proportion of
directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the
compensation committee. B_COOPTION is the proportion of
directors who are appointed after the CEO assumes office on the
board of directors. COOPTED_CC is an indicator variable equal
to one if the majority of compensation committee directors are
appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero
otherwise. COOPTED_B is an indicator variable equal to one if
the majority of directors on the board are appointed after the
incumbent CEO assumes office, and zero otherwise. CEO_CHAIR
is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO is the chairman of
the board of directors, and zero otherwise. B_INDEPENDENCE is
the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors.
CC_INDEPENDENCE is the proportion of outsiders on the
compensation committee. IND_NORM is an indicator variable
equal to one if the firm has a nominating committee that consists
of only outside directors. CC_SIZE is the number of directors on
the compensation committee. B_SIZE is the number of directors
on the board of directors. B_BUSY is the proportion of board
directors who sit on more than three other boards of public
companies. CC_BUSY is the proportion of compensation
committee directors who sit on more than three other boards of
public companies. B_LONGSERV is the average tenure of
directors on the board. CC_LONGSERV is the average tenure of
directors on the compensation committee. CC_OWNERSHIP is
the total shares held by directors on the compensation committee
divided by total outstanding shares. B_OWNERSHIP is the total
shares held by directors on the board divided by total outstanding
shares. B_SIZE is the number of directors on the board.
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retirement. The coefficient on the interaction term
HORIZON × DIR_TENURE is significantly negative
(t = −0.015. p = .02), which indicates that as the aver-
age tenure of directors on the board and the compensa-
tion committees increases, retiring CEOs are more
likely to cut R&D expenditures. The results provide
support for H1 and H5. Inconsistent with our prediction,
the coefficient on HORIZON × DIR_INDEPENDENCE,
HORIZON × DIR_SIZE, HORIZON × BUSY_DIR, and
HORIZON × DIR_OWNERSHIP is insignificant.
EXHIBIT 4 Regression results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on the association
between R&D spending and CEO horizon problem
Variable Pred. sign Coeff. p-Value
Intercept 0.017 (<.01)
HORIZON ? 0.001 (.60)
CEO_POWER ? 0.002 (.00)
DIR_INDEPENDENCE ? 0.003 (<.01)
DIR_SIZE ? −0.051 (<.01)
BUSY_DIR ? 0.002 (.01)
DIR_TENURE ? 0.003 (.27)
DIR_OWNERSHIP ? −0.002 (.01)
HORIZON × CEO_POWER − −0.003 (.03)
HORIZON × DIR_INDEPENDENCE + −0.001 (.46)
HORIZON × DIR_SIZE ? 0.016 (.18)
HORIZON × BUSY_DIR − −0.001 (.25)
HORIZON × DIR_TENURE − −0.015 (.02)
HORIZON × DIR_OWNERSHIP + −0.001 (.20)
TOBINS_Q + 0.005 (<.01)
LAG_RET + −0.007 (<.01)
FCF + −0.193 (<.01)
ROA − 0.184 (<.01)
SIZE ? 0.001 (.06)
FIRM_AGE − −0.000 (<.01)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + −0.001 (.46)
INDUSTRY_RD + 0.064 (<.01)
Number of observations 5,589
R2 49.07%
Note: The exhibit presents the regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee factors on mitigating
opportunistic R&D reduction. RD is the R&D expense scaled by total assets. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if
CEOs are in each of the final 2 years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. CEO_POWER is the factor on which
CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have high loadings. DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the
factor on which B_INDEPENDENCE, CC_INDEPENDENCE, and IND_NORM have high loadings. DIR_SIZE is the factor on which
CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the factor on which B_BUSY and CC_BUSY have high loadings.
DIR_TENURE is the factor on which B_LONGSERV and CC_LONGSERV have high loadings. DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor on
which CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high loadings. TOBINS_Q is calculated as the market value of equity plus the
book value of debt, all scaled by total assets. LAG_RET is the firm's stock return from previous year. FCF is the operating cash
flows plus R&D expense minus capital expenditures, all scaled by sales. ROA is operating net income before R&D expense scaled
by assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. FIRM_AGE is the natural logarithm of
the number of years between year t and the first year the company listed on Compustat. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the natural
logarithm of the CEO's dollar wealth increase from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002).
INDUSTRY_RD is the average R&D expenditures of other firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The p-values are presented in
parentheses and are two-tailed. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of
brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators.
130 LIU AND LIU
Exhibit Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for
the variables used in Discretionary Accruals test. Pearson
correlations are reported in Exhibit Panel B.
Exhibit reports the regression analysis of the effect of
board and compensation committee factors on the associ-
ation between accruals management and the CEO hori-
zon problem. The coefficient on the interaction term
HORIZON × DIR_SIZE is negative and significant (coeffi-
cient = −0.439, p = .02), which indicates that the size of
the board and compensation committee decreases
accruals management when CEOs face potential horizon
problem. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on
HORIZON × DIR_OWNERSHIP is negative and margin-
ally significant (p = .10).
EXHIBIT 5 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the discretionary accruals test
Panel A: Descriptive statistics





DA 8,541 0.01 0.84 −0.07 0.01 0.12
HORIZON 8,541 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
EQUITY_INCENTIVES 8,541 0.25 0.22 0.09 0.17 0.34
SIZE 8,541 7.38 1.42 6.31 7.23 8.32
STD_CASHFLOW 8,541 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06
STD_REV 8,541 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.18
STD_SALESGROWTH 8,541 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.13 0.24
OLDFIRM 8,541 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
LEVERAGE 8,541 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.22 0.34
Panel B: Pearson correlations
DA
EQUITY_





STD_CASHFLOW −.02 −.01 −.31
STD_REV .01 −.02 −.19 .36
STD_SALESGROWTH .01 −.00 −.04 .27 .24
OLDFIRM .03 −.15 .36 −.17 −.08 −.14
LEVERAGE .02 −.2 .38 −.19 −.07 .05 .18
Note: Panel A presents the descriptive statistics. DA is the discretionary accruals. HORIZON is an indicator variable equal to one if CEOs are
in each of the final 2 years prior to their retirement, and zero otherwise. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change in CEO's wealth from
a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the dollar change, salary and bonus.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows
from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous 2 years. STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total
assets over the current and previous 4 years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous
4 years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities
deflated by total assets.
Panel B presents the Pearson correlations. DA is the discretionary accruals. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar change
in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the
dollar change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year.
STD_CASHFLOW is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and
previous 4 years. STD_REV is the standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous 4 years.
STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales growth over the current and previous 4 years. OLDFIRM equals one
if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by
total assets. Correlations with p-values equal to or lower than .05 are in boldface. Correlations with p-values equal to or
lower than 0.05 are in boldface.
LIU AND LIU 131
7 | CONCLUSIONS
We examine whether the characteristics of the board and the
compensation committee are associated with CEO horizon
problem using principal components analysis. We find that
both CEO power and director tenure increases the likelihood
of R&D curtailment when CEOs approach retirement. We
also document that the size of the board of directors and the
compensation committee decreases the likelihood of accruals
managementwhenCEOs face horizon problem.
EXHIBIT 6 Regression results: The effect of board and compensation committee factors on the association
between discretionary accruals and CEO horizon problem
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-Value
Intercept 0.212 (.08)
HORIZON ? 0.012 (.71)
CEO_POWER ? −0.019 (.08)
DIR_INDEPENDENCE ? −0.011 (.36)
DIR_SIZE ? 0.130 (.08)
BUSY_DIR ? −0.005 (.61)
DIR_TENURE ? 0.002 (.42)
DIR_OWNERSHIP ? −0.003 (.39)
Horizon × CEO_POWER + 0.018 (.30)
Horizon × DIR_INDEPENDENCE − 0.018 (.61)
Horizon × DIR_SIZE ? −0.439 (.02)
Horizon × BUSY_DIR + 0.017 (.28)
Horizon × DIR_TENURE + −0.192 (.14)
Horizon × DIR_OWNERSHIP − 0.023 (.10)
EQUITY_INCENTIVES + 0.047 (.35)
SIZE − −0.008 (.40)
STD_CASHFLOW ? −0.793 (.07)
STD_REV ? 0.141 (.20)
STD_SALESGROWTH ? −0.008 (.90)
OLDFIRM ? 0.019 (.42)
LEVERAGE ? −0.002 (.97)
MARKETTOBOOK ? −0.005 (.32)
Number of observations 8,526
R2 4.72%
Note: The exhibit reports regression analysis of the effect of board and compensation committee factors on mitigating opportunistic accruals
management. CEO_POWER is the factor on which CC_COOPTION, B_COOPTION, COOPTED_CC, COOPTED_B, and CEO_CHAIR have
high loadings. DIR_INDEPENDENCE is the factor on which B_INDEPENDENCE, CC_INDEPENDENCE, and IND_NORM have high
loadings. DIR_SIZE is the factor on which CC_SIZE and B_SIZE have high loadings. BUSY_DIR is the factor on which B_BUSY and
CC_BUSY have high loadings. DIR_TENURE is the factor on which B_LONGSERV and CC_LONGSERV have high loadings.
DIR_OWNERSHIP is the factor on which CC_OWNERSHIP and B_OWNERSHIP have high loadings. EQUITY_INCENTIVES is the dollar
change in CEO's wealth from a 1% change in stock price, as measured in Core and Guay (2002), then normalized by the sum of the dollar
change, salary and bonus. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the current year. STD_CASHFLOW is the
standard deviation of cash flows from operations deflated by total assets over the current and previous 4 years. STD_REV is the standard
deviation of sales deflated by total assets over the current and previous 4 years. STD_SALESGROWTH is the standard deviation of sales
growth over the current and previous 4 years. OLDFIRM equals one if a firm is listed on Compustat for more than 20 years, and zero
otherwise. LEVERAGE is total liabilities deflated by total assets. MARKETTOBOOK represents deciles of market value of assets divided by
the book value of assets ranked within each year. The p-values are presented in parentheses and are two-tailed. The standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust, clustered by firm and year. For the sake of brevity, we do not report coefficient estimates for year indicators,
G_index indicators, exchange indicators, and industry indicators.
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Our findings have implications for corporate gover-
nance. The findings reveal that compensation committees
play an important role in mitigating the CEO horizon
problem by adjusting CEO compensation package. How-
ever, the effectiveness of compensation committees in
this role is contingent on its quality. Furthermore, our
study may provide practical implications for investors.
Since stock market reacts negatively to CEO horizon
problem (Kalyta, 2009), less powerful CEO, directors with
shorter tenure, and larger board of directors and compen-




1Pourciau (1993) classifies CEO turnovers as routine turnovers in
which a successor is chosen, or several contestants are identified;
and nonroutine turnovers, which include voluntary and involun-
tary resignations.
2The six characteristics include the proportion of co-opted directors, the
proportion of senior directors, the proportion of directors who are CEOs
of other companies, the proportion of directors with block shareholdings
in the company, the proportion of directors who have three or more
board seats, and the size of the compensation committee.
3We calculate EQUITY_INCENTIVES as 1%× the firm's share price× (#
of shares + # of options× option delta).We followCore andGuay (2002)
methodology to calculate option delta separately for newly granted
options, unexercisable options, and exercisable options before the year
of 2006. After the passage of SFAS 123R, Execucomp stops providing the
inputs necessary to calculate Black-Scholes value of option delta. we fol-
lowExecucomp assumptions to construct self-calculated inputs.
4We use the modified Jones model below to estimate both
nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals:
ACCit = β0 + β1 1=TAt−1ð Þ+ β2 ΔSalesit−ΔRecitð Þ+ β3 PPEitð Þ+ εt,
where ACCit is accruals deflated by beginning total assets. TAt-1 is
beginning total assets, ΔSalesit is change in sales deflated by begin-
ning total assets, ΔRecit is change in accounts receivable deflated by
beginning total assets. PPEit is gross property, plant and equipment
deflated by beginning total assets. β0, β1, β, and β3 are estimated
cross-sectionally for each year and industry combination. We esti-
mate nondiscretionary accruals deflated by beginning total assets
(NDACCit) based on these cross-sectional coefficients along with
each firm's data. Discretionary accruals deflated by beginning total
assets (DACCit) are therefore ACCit less NDACCit.
5When estimating model (3)–(6), we further remove the firm-year
observations with CEO tenure less than 3 years, to avoid the influ-
ence of the previous CEO.
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